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AI Law & Innovation Institute

Ensuring Humanity Thrives as We Move into the Age of AI

Who We Are

The AI Law & Innovation Institute (AI Institute) is a think tank at the University of California Law SF鈥檚 Center for Innovation (C4i). The AI Institute operates聽by looking ahead to the issues policy makers will face, engaging in the academic research to analyze those issues, and creating a stable of policy options to provide the federal and state legislators and regulators who reach out to us each year for technical advice.

Professor Robin Feldman, founder and director of the AI Institute,听has published academic work on AI since 2004 and provided technical advice on AI since 2017 to federal and state governmental bodies, including the Army Cyber Institute, GAO, FTC, DOJ, USPTO, the National Academies of Sciences, and members of Congress. Professor Feldman responds to as many as 50 governmental requests per year across all topics at C4i.

A team of 14 at C4i combines faculty scholars, research managers, clinical coordinators, and communications staff working across three interconnected programs:聽AI Law & Innovation Institute; Law & Medicine Initiative; and Startup Legal Garage.

 

Supporting the Institute

Donations to support the work of the Institute may be made online . All supporters of our work are listed publicly here.

Robin’s Rules of Order for AI

This series of reflections by Professor Feldman provides principles for how to think about developments in AI.

Feldman Interviews Feldman: “How I Used AI in Writing a Book about AI”

This video podcast episode with Boris Feldman, described by Chambers USA as 鈥淭he King of Silicon Valley,鈥 examines Professor Feldman鈥檚 experience of using different AI models to learn about the math and science underlying AI. The discussion emphasizes that 鈥淎I serves best as human augmentation, not as human replacement.鈥

Government Activities Related to AI

For almost a decade, Professor Feldman and C4i have provided guidance on AI to government institutions, including:

  • Technical advice to congressional committees and state officials on regulation of AI
  • The Army Cyber Institute’s聽threat casting exercise on Weaponization of Data
  • The GAO鈥檚聽Artificial Intelligence Roundtable report to Congress on the future of AI
  • The United Nations聽(address delivered to the 2023 General Assembly Science Summit on the impact of AI, delivered by Chancellor David Faigman)
  • The Federal Trade Commission鈥檚聽hearing on Emerging Competition, Innovation, and Market Structure Questions Around Algorithms, AI, and Predictive Analytics
  • The US Patent & Trademark Office’s聽Listening Session on Patents and AI Inventorship
  • The National Academies’聽Workshop on AI and Machine Learning to 聽聽Accelerate Translational Research, for the Government-University-Industry Research Roundtable
  • The National Academies’聽Workshop on Robotics and AI

Selected Publications by Professor Robin Feldman

  • AI shrinks the value proposition: As AI continues to embed itself throughout society, it shakes loose the foundations of what we choose to protect with IP, forcing us to reconsider how each pillar of IP derives its value鈥攃opyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret.
  • Intellectual property regimes have largely assumed the centrality of humans to innovation and creativity. But, if AI systems can easily produce much of what humans invent, create, or capture through trade secrets, many human contributions to creativity may no longer satisfy the requirements of protection.

AI Versus IP describes how the legal system can mitigate the problems ahead by 1) casting the net only around the remarkable, to preserve value, and 2) restoring confidence in both AI and IP by establishing a public鈥損rivate certification and benchmarking body (akin to the 鈥淕ood Housekeeping Seal of Approval鈥).

  • AI can enable price collusion without direct communication among competitors.
  • The market structure and private information of PBMs create a heightened risk of collusion.
  • With AI algorithms, it is hard to draw the line between collusion and efficiency.

Artificial Intelligence and Cracks in the Foundation of IP

, proposing that for AI-generated works, companies should receive a shorter period of protection, enforced through the context of regulatory approval, in exchange for openness to the regulatory agency. This is modeled partially after FDA data rights for pharmaceuticals.

Highlights three potential issues with patenting AI-generated inventions:

  • Timeline: A 20-year patent is an eternity for AI. When it comes to the speed of change, AI travels in an entirely different dimension.
  • Transparency: Where the invention calls for a method patent鈥攆or example, a method of using an AI to determine when a car hits the brakes, or whether an applicant will receive a loan鈥攖he limited disclosure norms in software patent law may not be enough. To gain societal acceptance of AI, policy makers and the public will want someone to look under the hood.
  • Collective contribution to creativity: To the extent that AI systems are deriving their creative results, in part, through the collective decisions of numerous people, can the AI鈥檚 creativity be attributable solely to the program, or its operator, or its owner?

Argues further that both in terms of the incentives given to people by listing them as the inventor of a patent, and in terms of the susceptibility to deterrence presented by rights controlled by others, it is neither socially desirable nor entirely coherent to list AI on patents.


with former SEC Commissioner Kara Stein

Recommends a structure for the regulation of AI built on three pieces of structural scaffolding:

  • Touchpoints: where AI most tangibly interacts with the broader financial system.
  • Types of evil: dividing harms inflicted by AI into the categories of聽the evil you planned,听the evil you could have predicted, and聽unpredictable harms.
  • Types of players: identifying actors as聽users,听intermediaries, or聽肠谤别补迟辞谤蝉听of AI, and acknowledging that different harms may be reasonably predictable to the AI creator, for example, than to the user, or to actors in other fields.

Flowing from an Army Cyber-Institute threat casting exercise and聽published 18 months before COVID-19 emerged in China:

  • Hypothesizes a public health emergency arising out of Asia that disrupts the U.S. health care system and creates distrust of government information. (The hypothesized scenario originates from data corruption, not from a biological virus).
  • Predicts that some US sub-populations will look for other sources of information that are not uniformly reliable or of the best intentions.
  • Stresses that some US sub-populations will look for other sources of information that are not uniformly reliable or of the best intentions.
  • Proposes that 鈥淎I systems should be subject to review entirely outside the system itself 鈥 either industry bodies or public bodies. As an average citizen, I may never understand how a biologic interchangeable is being produced, at least not enough to trust that the drug is safe. Nevertheless, I might trust the FDA. This form of institutionalized outside review, whether by private or public entities, will be essential for adequate trust and distrust.鈥

; 30 Stanford L. & Pol鈥檡 Rev. 399

Suggests that 鈥渢he pathways we use to place our trust in medicine聽provide聽useful models for learning to trust AI. As we stand on the brink of the Al revolution, our challenge is to create the structures and聽expertise聽that give all of society confidence in decision-making and information integrity.鈥

Proposes that a government body could create and regulate standards to:

  • Document a dataset鈥檚 purpose, intended use, potential misuse, and areas of ethical and legal concern.
  • Provide information integrity requirements for accuracy, completeness, and archival purposes.
  • Address when conflicts of interest arise between cost savings from deploying AI and quality of patient/consumer care.

A Deeper Dive into the Institute’s Work